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EXPORT INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE EXAMPLE OF WEST MALAYSIA1
By DAVID LIM
Attempts to test economic hypotheses empirically often encounter two problems. The first
is that theoretical formulations do not always result in relationships between variables
which can be observed directly. Under these circumstances further relationships between
the unobservable variables and other variables which can be observed will have to be
specified before the original hypotheses can be tested empirically. This is a legitimate but
not always successful method of circumventing the difficulty.2 The second obstacle
encountered is the shortage of reliable statistical data for those variables which can be
observed. This is a problem that is especially serious in less developed countries where the
machinery for collecting statistical data is still in its infancy. Under such conditions indirect
methods have often to be substituted for direct methods in the empirical verification of
economic hypotheses. The purpose of this paper is to show the presence of these two
problems in, and therefore the difficulty of, substantiating the claim that export instability
has been detrimental to the economic development of West Malaysia over the period 194770.
I
The hypothesis that export instability has affected the rate of growth of the West Malaysian
economy adversely consists of three distinct but related parts. The first is the establishment
that the degree of export instability in West Malaysia is high by international standards and
the reasons for such instability. The second is the establishment that fluctuations in the
export sector have been transmitted to the rest of the economy and the third that
economic instability per se has resulted in a decrease in the long-term rate of growth of the
economy.
The first part of the hypothesis is relatively easy to test as there is little conceptual
ambiguity and the statistical data required are easily available and reliable. Various studies
over the years have recorded severe fluctuations in the prices and proceeds of West
Malaysian exports. Thus Coppock (1962), using the log variance method,3 found the
instability indices for the unit value of exports for West Malaysia and a group of forty-five
less developed countries for 1946-58 to be 29.4 and 17.6 respectively. The instability index
for the total value of exports for West Malaysia for the same period was 41b9 compared to
the 23 1 for the sample as a whole. In a study that covered the period 1948-57 Michaely
(1962) found the index of the average year-to-year fluctuations, adjusted for trend, of
export prices for West Malaysia to be the third highest in his sample of thirty-six developed
and less developed countries.
The extreme instability of the export earnings of West Malaysia is also brought out in a
study by Erb and Schiavo-Campo (1969). Using the Coppock log variance method they
discovered that the means of the instability indices of export earnings for eighteen
developed and forty-five less developed countries for 1946-58 were 17.6 and 23.0
respectively while the medians were 18.1 and 18.3 respectively. These values are
considerably smaller than the 38.9 recorded for West Malaysia. There was also a significant
difference over the later period 1954-66, for the index for West Malaysia was 16.5 while the

mean (median) values for the developed and less developed countries were 6.2 (6.3) and
13.4 (12.8) respectively.
A different index of instability was used by Leith (1970) in his study of the extent of export
fluctuations in twenty-five developed and seventy less developed countries over the period
1948-58. A least squares linear trend line was fitted for the period and the instability index
calculated as the average of the absolute percentage deviations from the trend. How- ever,
Leith's results also showed that the West Malaysian export sector experienced an aboveaverage degree of instability for while the means (medians) of the instability indices for the
developed and the less developed countries were 7.9 (7.4) and 12.0 (9.9) respectively, the
index for West Malaysia was 19.6.
The findings of these studies can be accepted because in each case the degree of instability
has been measured around the trend so that the growth over the period as a whole has
been separated from the year-to-year deviations from the growth path. Failure to eliminate
the trend will place a country, whose exports have been growing rapidly or growing at a
constant rate, artificially high on the instability scale. The statistical data used for the
analysis are also relatively accurate, for data on the foreign trade sector, especially if that
sector is dominated by a few commodities, are easy to collect and are widely accepted to be
the most reliable of all the data collected in less developed countries.
It is generally accepted that low price elasticities of supply and demand together with
uncontrolled shifts in the supply and demand provide a sufficient reason for the severe
fluctuations in the prices and proceeds of primary products. In the case of West Malaysia
the establishment of such supply and demand conditions in the export sector is greatly
simplified by the fact that the earnings of rubber and tin account for well over 80 per cent of
the total export proceeds. The search for the cause of export instability can therefore be
concentrated on the supply and demand conditions for these two commodities.
The price elasticity of supply of rubber producers in West Malaysia is known to be very
small. For example, when annual data for 1948-61 were used Wharton (1963) obtained
elasticities that varied between -0.03 and -0.01 for estates. When monthly data were used
on the assumption that annual production figures would neutralize any short-run response,
the elasticities obtained were again not statistically significant. Much the same conclusion
was reached from the analysis on smallholders, for only one of the six price elasticities of
supply estimated was statistically different from zero. The results were more or less the
same when the estimating equation was expanded to include composition, mature acreage,
and trend as determinants. The highest value obtained (and the only statistically significant
one at the 10 per cent level) was 0 12 which indicates a low degree of price response. These
results were confirmed in a later study by Stern (1965).
The price responsiveness of the producers of tin is also small. Table 1 shows the price
elasticities of supply of the dredging, gravel pump, hydraulicing, opencast, underground,
and dulang washing sectors. The price elasticity of supply of the West Malaysian tin industry
as a whole has also been included. The model of supply response used is the linear
Nerlovian adjustment one and the independent variables included are the Penang ex-works
price, a refined dummy variable for export control, and, of course, output lagged a year.

The elasticities have been calculated at the mean values and show that tin producers in
West Malaysia are not responsive to price movements as a whole. Four of the six sectors
have negative values which are not statistically different from zero. The opencast sector has
a relatively high, positive, and statistically significant price elasticity of supply (0.81) but this
is not representative of the West Malaysian industry as the opencast sector accounts for
only about 2 per cent of the total West Malaysian output. By far the most important sectors
are the dredging and the gravel pump sectors which together account for about 89 per cent
of the total output. The price elasticity of output of the West Malaysian tin mining sector is
therefore 0-20, which is somewhere between the -009 recorded for the dredging sector and
the 0 33 for the gravel pump sector, and which indicates a relatively small degree of price
responsiveness.

The price elasticities of demand for rubber and tin are also not large. Table II shows that the
price elasticity of demand for rubber for the world in 1953-66 is not statistically different

from zero. Of the elasticities obtained for the six major consuming countries only that for
Japan is statistically significant and this at -0.27 clearly indicates a relatively low degree of
price responsiveness. The picture is more or less the same for the demand for tin. The price
elasticity of demand obtained for the world is not statistically significant while the values of
those that are (U.S.A., U.K., and France) are considerably smaller than one.
On the other hand, rubber and tin are strategic raw materials and their demand curves are
known to shift sharply and frequently. Their income elasticities of demand have also been
noted to be quite high while the development of substitutes has only served to narrow the
market and therefore concentrate demand fluctuations on the two commodities (Balassa,
1964; Nehmer, 1959; Desai, 1966).
The supply curves of rubber and tin are relatively stable as the production of neither
commodity is significantly affected by the vagaries of the elements (McHale, 1966; Yip,
1969). However, such stability is more than offset by the demand instability and by the price
inelasticities of supply and demand for the two commodities. On the whole, it would seem
that the supply and demand conditions for rubber and tin provide an entirely plausible
explanation of the high degree of export instability in West Malaysia.
II
The testing of the second part of the argument against export instability, that there is a
causal relationship between export instability and economic instability, also presents no
conceptual difficulties. A change in the total value of exports will affect the incomes of the
producers in the export sector directly. This will in turn affect their consumption and
investment expenditures and so indirectly the incomes of other producers in the economy.
This is the familiar multiplier effect. There is also an accelerator effect as the direct and
indirect effects on the income level will influence the over-all investment climate. It can be
expected that these two effects will combine to produce changes in the gross national
product which are in the same direction and which, in the absence of government
intervention, will be more than proportional to the initial changes in the export proceeds.
There is, however, an unfortunate tendency to measure the impact of export instability on
the gross domestic product (GDP) instead of the gross national product (GNP). The latter is
the correct one to use if the intention is to show how the internal economy has been
affected. The gross domestic product includes profits repatriated to foreigners and will give
an exaggerated picture of the degree of instability of the internal economy if the foreign
companies allow the repatriated profits to fluctuate while keeping the operating costs and
the payments to the host country steady.
This is more a problem of the mis-specification of the relationship between export
instability and economic instability than one of an inherent conceptual difficulty in
specifying the relationship between the two variables. The same observation may be made
also of past attempts to specify the relation- ship between changes in export earnings (AX)
and changes in the GNP (AY). There has been a failure to incorporate certain characteristics
of under- development in the relationship with the result that the foreign-trade multiplier is
often overestimated. To be more specific, the foreign-trade multiplier should, as suggested
by MacBean (1966), be given as:

(1 - px - mx - tx)/(my + sy + ty)

(1)

where px is the proportion of export earnings repatriated to foreigners, mx the proportion of
export earnings paid for imports which are re-exported in a natural or processed form, tx the
proportion of export proceeds which accrues to the government through taxes on export,
my the marginal propensity to import, sy the marginal propensity to save, and ty the
proportion of the change in domestic income which accrues to the government through
taxes whose revenues respond to changes in the domestic income and expenditure.
The first two items, px and mx, are seldom deducted from the primary change in the export
earnings in most of the formulae used. This has led to a considerable overestimation of the
foreign-trade multiplier in those cases where the two items are important. In the case of the
West Malaysian economy the value of px is quite significant in view of the important role of
the foreign sector and the 'openness' of the economy. Over 90 per cent of the acreage
under oil palm, 60 per cent of the tin output, and 42 per cent of the rubber production are
under foreign ownership. There is no restriction on the outflow of investible funds from the
country and every year the outflow of such funds amounts to over 21 per cent of the total
export proceeds (Silcock, 1961; Wheelwright, 1965).
The import of primary commodities for re-export is a flourishing industry in West Malaysia.
Thus over the period 1947-70 about 5 per cent of the gross export proceeds of rubber were
imported while the proportions for palm oil and tin exports were 3 and 20 per cent
respectively. If the shares of these three commodities in the total export proceeds of West
Malaysia were used as weights, then the above figures suggest that the gross export
earnings should be reduced by about 10 per cent.
If these two deductions together with those of tx (0.08), my (0.43), Sy (0.18), and ty (0.08)
were made, then the foreign-trade multiplier of West Malaysia works out to be 0.88. If the
reductions px and mx were omitted, the multiplier then turns out to be artificially high at 1
33. Again it should be emphasized that this tendency to overestimate the multiplier is the
result not of an inherent difficulty in conceptualizing the problem but rather one of a failure
to identify certain characteristics of an open and a trade-oriented economy.
Table III shows that on a current-year basis and adjusted for trend there is a consistent
relationship between the direction of change in the GNP and the export earnings in current
prices over the period 1947-72. When the 3-year moving average method of obtaining the
trend was used,4 eighteen of the twenty-four pairs of observations moved in the same
direction. The evidence was less conclusive when the linear regression method5 and the
common-sense method of subtracting the average annual increase in GNP or export
earnings from the actual increase or decrease in each case were used. However, the
relationships obtained are stronger than could be expected to arise from chance, an
observation that is supported by the results of the simple regression analysis.

It has thus been possible to establish, from the available empirical data, that there is a
consistent relationship between changes in the GNP and changes in the export earnings.
The evidence also shows that important leakages exist in the West Malaysian economy and
that these have tended to dampen the multiplier and accelerator effects of export
instability.
III
The evidence does not, however, show that economic instability in West Malaysia is of no
significance. In a sample of thirty-five less developed countries which did not include West
Malaysia, Coppock found the average index of instability of the GNP over the period 194658 to be 11x9 (1962, Table A.2). The instability index for the West Malaysian GNP, obtained
by using the same formula and for the same period, is considerably higher at 1541. Only the
Philippines, Colombia, and Paraguay could be said to be economically more unstable over
the period.
It has often been argued that this economic instability has been detrimental to the process
of economic development in West Malaysia. Considerable sympathy for the contention can
be adduced on an a priori level but the empirical verification of the hypothesis encounters
so many problems that the hypothesis may, at best, be said to remain unproven.
The a priori arguments are usually presented at two levels. The first emphasizes the adverse
effects that economic instability has on investment. It is argued that instability results in
business miscalculations and encourages a speculative mentality. Business is therefore
forced to keep a highly liquid assets position and to maintain a highly flexible form of
organization. The net effect is therefore to make long-term capital difficult to obtain, distort
the structure of interest rates, and encourage commodity trading. Productive activities
requiring substantial fixed investment are also discouraged as is the replacement of small
businesses by large-scale operations using modern equipment (IBRD, 1955, p. 647).

Economic instability may also result in inflation. An autonomous increase in export proceeds
generates increased incomes in the export sector which in turn may most probably lead to
successful trade union pressures for higher wages. A subsequent fall in export earnings may
not result in a proportionate decrease in labour costs as wages are generally 'sticky' in the
downward direction and this may lead to a rise in unemployment and its attendant social
and political unrests. Governments usually try to avoid such upheavals by drawing upon
their gold and foreign exchange reserves to maintain the increased income level. However,
such a policy cannot be expected to be maintained for long and import controls will have to
be imposed. The effect of this is to shift demand to domestically produced goods and unless
the production of such goods can respond adequately this will probably lead to a rise in the
cost of living. This may well act as the starting-point for another round of wage increases.
The development policies of governments may also help to increase the inflationary
pressures. In their efforts to accelerate the rate of development governments may adopt
expansionary policies during boom periods. A downward movement in export earnings may
not, however, see a reduction in government expenditures. These are also usually 'sticky' in
the downward direction for political and economic reasons and governments may be forced
to reduce the import of consumption-oriented goods in order to be assured of an adequate
flow of intermediate and capital goods. How- ever, unless domestic production of
consumption-oriented goods can increase sufficiently to cope with the increased demand
inflation may again be the result (Myrdal, 1956, pp. 238-53).
Investment under inflationary conditions, it is then argued, usually takes an unproductive
direction in the form of real estate and the purchase of land. Thus Nurkse has commented
that it would tend to be concentrated on 'residential construction, largely for the upper
income groups and on luxury industries, while essential public installations such as railways
and ports have in some cases tended to fall in disrepair' (1953, p. 117).
The second group of arguments against economic instability centres round the
administrative difficulties that it creates for governments. The recurrent balance of
payments crises and the constant need to impose import controls on consumption-oriented
goods will divert the attention of scarce government personnel from other equally
important development problems. It will also impede the import of strategic developmental
products at crucial moments in the implementation of development plans. This is a problem
that is especially acute in those less developed countries where the import of such products
is already at a high level for then fluctuations in export earnings will lead immediately to
fluctuations in the import of these goods. The ability of such countries to implement their
development plans will thus be impaired with subsequent adverse effects on their rate of
economic growth.
These are, in brief, the major theoretical arguments against economic instability and
together they seem to constitute a very persuasive case. Perhaps the most prominent of the
arguments in favour of economic instability within the context of economic development is
that of Caine (1954). His argument is that export price instability will encourage rather than
discourage investment as more capital may be formed when income and profits are high
only periodically than when they are stable and more evenly distributed over time.
Moreover, the export boom-induced invest- ment may not be matched by disinvestment in
periods of export slumps. The case of investment in the rubber industry in West Malaysia is

quoted as the classic example of the operation of the ratchet effect. The heavy capital
expenditures and the large expected future income stream will not only make disinvestment
impractical but will also exert constant pressure to reduce the cost of production whenever
there is a fall in the price of rubber. Caine pointed out that when prices were low in 1913-14
a lot of effort went into improving the productivity and the general efficiency of the rubber
industry in West Malaysia.
Another argument in favour of economic instability is that the marginal propensity to save
will tend to be higher under unstable conditions because of the need to have a larger
amount of reserves to cope with the contingencies. Unless the cash is deposited in banks
overseas the increased savings will provide funds for the investment programme (Michaely,
1962, p. 118; MacBean, 1966, p. 113).
The preference for one school of thought or the other is, however, basically a subjective
one. Whether economic instability has been detrimental to the process of growth in West
Malaysia can only be established by an empirical analysis. Unfortunately the nature of the
problem and the shortage of reliable statistical data make this an extremely difficult task.
IV
The conventional approach is to analyse the relationship between the rate of growth of the
real GDP (𝑌) or investment (𝐼) and export instability (𝑋) (MacBean, 1966). However, as the
adverse or favourable effects that economic instability is theoretically supposed to produce
on the economy are essentially long-term, it is difficult to specify an appropriate
relationship between 𝑌 or 𝐼 and 𝑋. For example, an analysis based on a current-year
comparison between 𝑌 or 𝐼 and 𝑋 is meaningless because the effects that instability has on
growth cannot be expected to be instantaneous. Indeed it is impossible to say even
conceptually what the lag should be. The only valid observation that can be made is that the
lag is conceptually more acceptable the longer it is.
On the other hand, too long a lag cannot be afforded in the West Malaysian case because
there is not a lengthy and reliable time-series on either GDP or investment. The time-series
on these two items does not go back beyond 1947 and even then the data for 1947-54 are
subject to a large margin of error. Benham published the combined national income
accounts for West Malaysia and Singapore for 1947-51 in 1951 (1951) and the West
Malaysian share was then estimated on the basis of changes in the population and foreign
trade of the two territories (Lim, 1967, Chapter 1). As somewhat heroic assumptions had to
be made in the calculation, the GDP or investment figures so derived for West Malaysia for
1947-51 must be very tentative. Very much the same can be said of the figures for 1952-4 as
these were obtained initially on a Pan-Malayan basis from an IBRD study (1955) and the
West Malaysian share was estimated in the same cavalier fashion. Official national accounts
statistics were not published until 1955 but the data for 1955-70 are also not very useful as
there are in effect two different series. The first, for the period 1955-66, is subject to a
considerable degree of error (Gill, 1967). The second is for the period 1960-70 and is not
comparable to the first series as it contains major revisions made possible by the recent
acquisition of a more reliable and comprehensive range of statistical data (Lim, 1973). This
means that reliable figures for the GDP and investment are available only for the period
1960-70. Such a short time-series does not allow a meaningful analysis to be made between

𝑌 or 𝐼 and 𝑋 even on a current-year basis, let alone allowing for any time-lag for the effects
of economic instability to make themselves felt on the economy.6
Even if the statistical data on the real GDP and investment were available it is by no means
certain that the long-term effects of economic instability on the rate of growth of the West
Malaysian economy could be ascertained by a single-equation model, however carefully the
allowance is made for the time-lag. The essence of one aspect of the theoretical arguments
is that instability can lead to either a greater or a smaller volume of investment and
therefore to either a higher or a lower rate of economic growth. However, the relationship
between the rate of growth of investment and economic instability is indirect and this
results in problems of identification. For example, the argument that instability can lead to a
higher level of investment depends on the presumption that instability encourages a higher
marginal propensity to save. The problem of identifying the causal relationship exists
because the capacity of a country to set aside resources for investment depends also, and
perhaps to a much larger extent, on other factors. The existence of a positive and
statistically significant relationship between I and X may not mean much under these
circumstances. Similarly the existence of a negative and statistically significant relationship
between I and X may not amount to much either. The development of a speculative
mentality, the predominance of small- scale family businesses, and the presence of inflation
which, it is argued, tend to affect investment adversely can be due to a host of other equally
feasible reasons. The same problem exists in the establishment of the administrative
argument against economic instability because inefficiency and rigidity in the administrative
machinery are almost certainly also caused by other factors.
The analysis so far suggests that it is not possible to establish a case for or against economic
instability from a study of the West Malaysian situation using the conventional direct
approach. However, no case can be established either by using the indirect and less
aggregative method of identifying the alleged consequences of economic instability in West
Malaysia (Lim, 1972). Take the first alleged consequence of the case against instability, the
premium for small-scale family businesses and an aversion for investment in long-term
industrial projects. The available evidence shows that there is indeed a numerical
predominance of small family firms but there is no reason to suppose that this is due to
economic instability. The small- ness of the industrial base, a consequence of the
mercantilist policies adopted during the colonial era, may be a simpler and more likely
explanation. Recent experience shows that long-term capital for industrial development in
West Malaysia is not difficult to obtain.7 However, this observation does not mean much by
itself because instability is only one of a large number of factors which determine
investment. Consider next the alleged consequence of the loss of continuity in the
implementation of development plans because of the inability of the administrative
machinery to adjust adequately to the recurrent balance of payments fluctuations.8 Surely it
would be difficult to say that the inability to adjust the composition of the country's imports
is due solely to economic instability. It is clear from these examples that the attempt to
establish the effects of economic instability on the rate of growth of the West Malaysian
economy in an indirect way also suffers from the problem of identification.
If no meaningful conclusion can be drawn by using either the direct or the indirect method
of analysis, then the case for or against economic instability must remain unproven for
neither can any conclusion be drawn from the existing cross-section studies (MacBean,

1966; Ariff, 1972; and Kenen and Voivodas, 1972). Firstly, somewhat conflicting results were
obtained by these studies. In an analysis of twenty-two less developed countries over the
period 1950-8, MacBean found no relationship between the rate of growth of the real GDP
(Y) and export instability (X).9 Neither was any relationship found between the rate of
growth of real investment (I) and X nor between the level of real investment (Q) and X for a
slightly bigger group of countries. More or less the same conclusions were reached by Ariff
in his study of thirty less developed countries over the period 1955-65, though the evidence
was less compelling. On the other hand, Kenen and Voivodas, with a different measure of
export instability, a bigger sample of countries, and a longer time period,10 found a
statistically significant negative relationship between Q and X, and concluded that
MacBean's results on the relationship between the two variables were valid only for the
1950s. Under these circumstances it would be difficult to say whether instability as a rule
deters economic development or not from the available cross-section studies.
Secondly, there is reason to doubt the statistical reliability of the study by MacBean. Timeseries which were not always articulated and statistical data which were not always reliable
were often used so that the results obtained could be misleading. Maizels (1968) has reestimated the relationship between Y and X using the same statistical function but on the
basis of a more discriminating use of the data presented by MacBean to produce an entirely
different result.11
Thirdly, the analytical framework provided by a cross-section approach assumes the
existence of a single and unique relationship between a given degree of export fluctuations
and the resultant change in the rate of growth of the real GDP for all countries. This
assumption cannot really be upheld as 'differences in economic structures, in the degree of
dependence of different economies on the foreign trade sector, particularly for supplies of
capital equipment, and in the ways in which they adjust to short-term changes in foreign
exchange earnings' (Maizels, 1968, p. 580) mean that the impact of a given degree of
instability in export earnings on the long- term rate of growth of the GDP is likely to vary
substantially from country to country.
A conceptually more satisfactory approach is to study the problem in each less developed
country in detail. However, attempts to carry out such a study for West Malaysia encounter
a number of conceptual and statistical problems that preclude the establishment of any
meaningful conclusion. The search for an acceptable approach has therefore come full
circle, a phenomenon that is not uncommon in the empirical verification of economic
hypotheses.
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
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[Footnote]
1

I am indebted to Tibor Barna and K. A. M. Ariff for useful comments on earlier
drafts of the paper. This acknowledgement is made with the usual disclaimer.

2

An example of this problem is found in supply response studies. The Nerlovian
adjustment model is very often used because it incorporates features which are
thought to be characteristic of the production of most primary commodities, that
is, technological and institutional constraints exist which allow only a fraction of
the intended output to be realized. Another popular model is the Nerlovian
expectations model which reflects the way in which past experience determines
the expected prices and other expectational variables which in turn determine the
output produced. The fundamental premises of the two models are entirely
different and the distinction is important in theory. However, the estimating
equations of the two models are basically the same and the existence of the
'duality' really makes nonsense of the important theoretical distinction (Nerlove,
1956).

3

This is given as being equal to antilog √(𝑉𝑙𝑜𝑔) where
2

𝑉𝑙𝑜𝑔 = 1/(𝑛 − 1) Σ[log (𝑋9:; /𝑋9 ) − 𝑚] , 𝑚 = 1/(𝑛 − 1) Σ[log (𝑋9:; /𝑋9 ) − 𝑚],

Xt = = value of export earnings or unit value of exports in period t, and n = the
number of periods.
4

Three years might not have been long enough to avoid many short-term
movements. On the other band, a longer period might have captured too little of
the secular movements. It would also have meant a serious reduction in the
number of observations.

5

Exponential and linear trends were fitted to the data and the results showed that
the trend was better approximated by a linear function of time.

6

For what it is worth the following equation was obtained by fitting a least squares
line to the observations on the annual growth rates of the GDP in 1959 prices (𝑌)

and the percentage deviations of the merchandise exports from trend (𝑋) over the
period 1947-70.

A lag of 2 years was chosen as scatter diagram analysis revealed that such a timelag produced the largest number of observations when the two variables moved in
opposite directions to support the argument against economic instability. The
figure in brackets is the 't' value and shows that the regression coefficient of 𝑋t-2 is
not statistically different from zero. There is, in other words, no statistical
relationship between 𝑌t and 𝑋t-2. However, in view of the conceptual weakness of
the approach and the unreliability of the statistical data, the lack of correlation
proves nothing one way or the other about the long-term effects of economic
instability on economic growth in West Malaysia.
7

When Hume Industries (Malaysia) Co. offered its shares to the West Malaysian
public they were over-subscribed by twenty-five times. This not an isolated case
for when Malayan Flour Mill (Sdn.) Bhd. and Shell Refining Company (Malaysia)
Bhd. floated their shares the over-subscription was twenty-fold. The potential
investment capital has also found its way into Government securities. A recent
floating of a development loan of M$75m. resulted in a subscription of M$136m.
For a detailed discussion see Drake (1969).

8

In practice this argument is, of course, not relevant as West Malaysia does not
suffer from a shortage of foreign reserves.

9

Both MacBean and Ariff measured export instability (𝑋) as the percentage
deviation of export earnings from the trend. The trend was obtained by fitting a 5year moving average to the data.

10 A first-order autoregressive scheme or a modified random walk approach was used
to obtain the regression trend line. Sample sizes of thirty and fifty countries were
used and the time-periods chosen were 1950-66 and 1956-67.
11 The relationships obtained by MacBean between Y on the one hand and X and
other determinants on the other were:

where 𝑌 is the rate of growth of the real GDP (195011-1957/8), 𝑋1 the rate of
growth of import capacity (1950/1-1957/8), 𝑋 the instability of the importing
power of exports (1948-58), T the ratio of foreign trade to income in 1957, and R
the change in reserves of foreign exchange and gold (1950/1-1957/8). The figures
in parentheses are the standard errors of the regression coefficients. The
equations clearly show that there is no relationship between economic growth and

export instability. However, by excluding a few special cases such as Iraq from the
sample and by substituting the growth in the fixed investment (𝐼) for the growth in
the total import capacity (𝑋1), Maizels was able to obtain the following
counterpart to equation (3):

This result suggests strongly that export instability is likely to act as an important
constraint to economic growth in less developed countries. Maizel's purpose in
estimating equation (5) was presumably to illustrate how a more discreet use of
the statistical data could bring about a different result. However, the force of his
argument is somewhat reduced by his mis-specification of the problem. The link
between 𝑌 and 𝑋 is indirect through the effect that 𝑋 has on 𝐼. Yet 𝐼 itself is made
an explicit determining variable in equation (5).

